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ABSTRACT
Advances in AI are powering increasingly precise and widespread
computational propaganda, posing serious threats to national se-
curity. The military and intelligence communities are starting to
discuss ways to engage in this space, but the path forward is still
unclear. These developments raise pressing ethical questions, about
which existing ethics frameworks are silent. Understanding these
challenges through the lens of “cognitive security,” we argue, offers
a promising approach.
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1 INTRODUCTION
As applications of artificial intelligence (AI) proliferate, concerns
grow aboutwhether AI-driven systems conform to or disrupt shared
values. Nowhere are such concerns more pronounced, especially
of late, than in discussions about automation and online influence
[e.g., 30, 50, 57].1 Researchers have long worried that social media
platforms, like Facebook and Twitter, which organize and distribute
much of the information people regularly access about the news,
about one another, and about events near and far, are failing to or-
ganize that information in ways that promote important epistemic
values, such as accuracy, objectivity, and diversity of perspective.2
Social media platforms fail to filter out false or sensationalized
∗Both authors contributed equally to this research.
1See also the work of the Oxford Internet Institute’s Computational Propaganda Project:
https://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/.
2The locus classicus of this view is [36]. For an argument against, see [64].
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stories, critics charge [23]. Indeed, because the algorithms select-
ing and arranging content in social media feeds are optimized for
user engagement (i.e., they are designed to deliver information
most likely to keep users’ attention locked in place, usually on the
websites and apps that serve as vehicles for revenue-generating ad-
vertisements), gripping, emotionally-charged media are prioritized
and promoted [62].
Of course, these concerns are not unique to digital social media;
many of the same criticisms were directed at television in the late-
20th century, and against radio before that [38]. What specifically
worries observers about the emergence of these problems in the
digital context is the speed at which media can be amplified and
the degree to which information flows are personalized for each
individual recipient [34]. More, while production of traditional me-
dia, such as television and radio, is concentrated in relatively few
hands—and is therefore easier to govern—the production of digital
media is diffuse, and thus, from a governance perspective, more
complicated to manage. These capabilities, of course, are born of
advances in AI. The same massive-scale data collection and infer-
ence algorithms behind state of the art recommender systems can
equally be leveraged for targeted exploitation of cognitive vulner-
abilities. Users of social media platforms generate great troves of
personal data through shared content, interactions with others’
content, and embedded social networks. They do so consistently
and over time, furnishing pattern learning technologies with ample
opportunity for sophisticated user profiling.3
Beyond concerns about the degradation of socially important
epistemic values, like accuracy and objectivity, another set of wor-
ries has emerged: namely, can these media, designed to capture and
hold attention, be leveraged by foreign adversaries to strategically
influence targeted populations? These worries also mirror earlier
concerns about radio and television propaganda, but they take on
special urgency in digital contexts because of the speed and target-
ing capabilities described above. In addition, these contexts afford
malicious actors relative anonymity, in hand with opportunities
for disguise as a peer or trusted source. Concern, both amongst
researchers and in the public sphere, has grown especially pro-
nounced since 2016, when state actors (e.g., the Russian Internet
Research Agency; IRA) appear to have successfully utilized social
media channels to influence voter behavior in elections around the
world [29]. According to U.S. Senator MarkWarner, D-Va., “We may
have in America the best 20th-century military that money can
buy, but we’re increasingly in a world where cyber vulnerability,
misinformation and disinformation may be the tools of conflict
[10].”
3For a recent review of Facebook profiling practices, see
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2019/01/16/facebook-algorithms-and-
personal-data.
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In response to these concerns, researchers and policymakers
have devoted significant attention to contemplating how some
combination of ethical reflection, market pressure, and legal regula-
tion might be brought to bear on social media companies to change
the way they organize and distribute information [e.g., 1, 24, 59].
However, less attention has focused on anticipating, evaluating, and
systematizing potential intelligence and national security responses
to the threats posed by adversaries leveraging advances in data min-
ing and targeting to shape domestic information landscapes. While
it is clear that the security community is deeply concerned about
these threats and is investing in research to understand andmitigate
them4, we have not yet seen concerted efforts to articulate ethi-
cal and policy parameters for the security community’s inevitable
interventions in this space, or guidance about the form such inter-
ventions should take.5 This is especially urgent because the ethical
frameworks traditionally used to guide military and other national
security activities may not be suited to navigating these challenges,
at least not in their present form.
To explain why, in the next section we describe how the secu-
rity community understands looming threats in the information
landscape as an evolution of “gray zone” conflict—organized, com-
petitive, non-kinetic interactions between states, and between states
and non-state actors. In Section 3, we gather information available
in the public domain about how the security community plans to
respond to these threats, and we describe potential paths they might
take. In Section 4, we examine, briefly, traditional frameworks for
assessing the morality of war and war fighting, and describe why
those frameworks are ill-suited to navigating the ethical questions
these new threats pose. Finally, in Section 5, we argue that the no-
tion of “cognitive security” offer a productive frame for articulating
and investigating these questions, and thus suggests a promising
way forward.
2 INFORMATION OPERATIONS AS
A GRAY ZONE
The post-World War II international legal order was built for a
state-centric world, in which organized, conventional militaries vie
for control over physical territory. It is premised on distinctions
between war and peace, foreign and domestic, public and private,
combatant and civilian. Today, these foundational premises are
on tenuous ground. The United States military/intelligence appa-
ratus increasingly operates in the context of so-called gray zone
aggression—competitive interactions among and within state and
non-state actors that fall between the traditional war and peace du-
ality [58]. Gray zone tactics can include cyberattacks, economic co-
ercion and sabotage, sponsorship of armed proxy fighters, military
expansionism, and hybrids thereof [4]. These types of interactions
have existed throughout military history, as state and non-state ac-
tors have leveraged economic pressure, propaganda, and espionage
to advance their agendas. The Cold War was a gray zone struggle.
But recent technological advances have engendered a significant
4See, e.g., DARPA’s Media Forensics and Semantic Forensics programs.
5The Pentagon recently adopted “ethics principles for using AI in war,” an encouraging
sign this may be changing [39].
shift toward gray zone aggression as the norm, rather than the ex-
ception [33], particularly with respect to cyber and cyber-enabled
threats.
A primary theatre for this type of sub-threshold aggression is the
information environment. Information operations (IO) describe the
range of offensive and defensive military and government strategies
and tactics designed to protect and exploit the information envi-
ronment. Under the broad IO umbrella, psychological operations
(PSYOPs) [45] refer specifically to the planned use of information
to influence the emotions, motivations, objective reasoning, and ul-
timately the behavior of foreign individuals, groups, organizations,
and governments [54].
The fundamental mission of PSYOPs has remained the same
sinceWorldWar I, when the US waged its first orchestrated military
propaganda campaign. The methods, however, have continuously
evolved to reflect changes in social, behavioral and political envi-
ronments, as well as in response to emerging technologies—from
leaflet drops in World War I, to radio broadcasts in WWII, to pirated
TV broadcasts in Panama in connection with the 1989 overthrow of
Manuel Noriega [56]. The Internet and, in particular, social media
has served as a force multiplier for PSYOPs, supporting breadth
and depth of reach rapidly and cost-effectively. Content generation,
targeting, and dissemination is increasingly automated. Once dis-
seminated, curated content is subsumed by networks of real users,
who in turn share it forward through their networks of Facebook
friends, Twitter followers, and other digitally-mediated audiences
[30, 47]. To understand the scope of these strategies, consider testi-
mony by Facebook’s General Counsel to the U.S. Senate about IRA
operations in 2015-2017:
We [Facebook] estimate that roughly 29 million peo-
ple were served content in their News Feeds directly
from the IRA’s 80,000 posts over the two years [2015-
2017]. Posts from these Pages were also shared, liked,
and followed by people on Facebook, and, as a result,
three times more people may have been exposed to a
story that originated from the Russian operation. Our
best estimate is that approximately 126 million people
may have been served content from a Page associated
with the IRA at some point during the two-year period.
[49, p. 5]
Importantly, online activity has also furnished a rich source of
data about individuals and populations that can be leveraged by ad-
versaries to customize their messaging. Moreover, that information
is updated dynamically as individuals interact with media online,
yielding feedback to content creators about what works and what
doesn’t [34, 63]. An Institute of Land Warfare paper argues:
The ubiquitous nature of electronic platforms pro-
vides a direct link, sans geography or security forces,
to influence foreign citizens at a massive scale, with
feedback—perhaps even through a user’s facial expressions—
that provides for themost difficult function of informa-
tion operations, i.e., measures of effectiveness. With
each click on a malign meme, the competitor gains
cookies, traffic data and a piece of network map to
drive further operations. [53, p. 4-5]
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Thus, while Russia’s 2016 social media disruption campaign fre-
quently betrayed itself with messages containing broken English or
off-topic cultural references [18], operations have grown increas-
ingly sophisticated, with smoother messaging and content better
matched to contemporary American political discourse [42].
3 NATIONAL SECURITY RESPONSES TO
AUTOMATED INFLUENCE
In 2018, the US Department of Defense (DoD) released its Cyber
Strategy [15], representing a significant shift from the 2015 plan it
replaced [14]. The new strategy adopts a more focused and assertive
posture, highlighting the “persistence” of Chinese and Russian cy-
ber operations, introducing a new mission to “defend forward”—i.e.,
to disrupt or halt malicious cyber activity at its source—and con-
cluding with a decisive charge to “prepare for war.” The document
explicitly speaks to the threat of online manipulation, stating: “Rus-
sia has used cyber-enabled information operations to influence our
population and challenge our democratic processes” (p. 1). A Sep-
tember 2019 report by the RANDCorporation emphasizes the threat
of hostile social manipulation with similar urgency, recommending
immediate investment in active defense measures [31].
Likewise, in advance of the 2020 U.S. presidential election, the
Department of Homeland Security Cybersecurity & Infrastructure
Security Agency has launched the #Protect2020 initiative [7]. Work-
ing with national partners to build resilience to foreign election
interference, this effort places special emphasis on information ac-
tivities (e.g., countering disinformation). The Agency proposes that
responding to foreign interference requires a “whole of society” ap-
proach, and in response it has put forth a number of resources aimed
at simplifying and taxonimizing the vast array of media-enabled
influence strategies [6, 8].
Ultimately, specific details about how the DoD will effectuate
active defense against foreign influence operations are—and will
likely remain—out of the public domain. There is sufficient infor-
mation, however, to sketch out plausible categories of AI-driven
response in the information space.6
3.1 Response 1: Flag and/or contextualize IO
A first set of plausible responses would develop warning systems
to flag suspected computational propaganda, with or without de-
tails about the nature of or confidence in the suspected offense.
A deployment of this type of approach might take the form of a
“confidence score” regarding the source or truthfulness of a piece
of content, make transparent the content lifespan (a trail back to
the originating account), or might provide alternate or additional
information and sources germane to the topic. This course would
cohere with recommendations of a 2018 Report of the U.S. Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations [9] proposing actions targeted at
increasing transparency and building a population more robust to
disinformation and manipulation.
6Of course, political or military action outside the information domain (e.g., access
to markets) will likely be considered as well, and there is an emerging literature on
so-called cross-domain deterrence, exploring the appropriate use of such approaches
in today’s complex power landscapes (see [28] for overview). Our focus in this paper
is on responses within the information environment.
The US has engaged in an effort to counter propaganda (specif-
ically Russian propaganda) with Polygraph.info, a government-
funded fact-checking website that seeks to provide truthful, fact-
based professional journalism in direct response to Russian disinfor-
mation. At this time, the effort is exceedingly small (Polygraph.info
has a staff of five people) and compartmentalized, issuing ex post
corrections dissociated in time and space from the content they
address.
In the future, one might imagine more comprehensive efforts in
collaboration with industry partners to label, fact-check, or con-
textualize suspected disinformation in real time, in native environ-
ments. Facebook has experimented with some of these approaches
with (as yet) mixed results. In 2016, they rolled out a “Disputed” fea-
ture to help users identify articles that failed to pass a fact-checking
standard, but found it failed to curb sharing and may even have
had the reverse effect [26]. In 2017, Facebook instead deployed
a “Related Articles” feature to provide additional sources for con-
troversial stories, which has been more successful [46]. Notably,
these features have thus far focused on news articles—i.e., “fake
news.” Whether and how they might be applied more broadly to
user-generated content raises both technical and ethical questions,
discussed below.
3.2 Response 2: Remove or limit the reach of IO
A second class of responses would take a more hands-on, aggressive
stance toward online influence efforts, attempting to prevent them
from being seen by target audiences in the first place. These re-
sponses would align with the “defend forward” posturing described
in the most recent DoD Cyber Strategy.
Facebook and Twitter have systematically removed content asso-
ciated with known disinformation campaigns linked to Iran, Russia,
Venezuela, and others [see, e.g., 27]. Twitter has gone so far as to
post these censored Tweets publicly to “enable independent aca-
demic research and investigation”[17]. The ex post censorship of
high-confidence, malicious, foreign accounts has generally not been
contested. However, these efforts have come too late to represent
meaningful remediation. Removed content has long receded from
view; new accounts have come online focused on the topics of
the day. Real-time take-down of suspected disinformation would,
in theory, operate within moments of content posting. Ideally, it
would do so with high precision and recall. In practice, though,
things would likely be messier and there would likely be a trade-off
between the rapid removal of suspected content and accuracy in
classifying that content as disinformation.
In a similar vein, one might imagine more modest approaches
to limit the reach of suspected disinformation, short of outright
removal. Specific tactics would likely vary across platforms, but
generally, would seek to de-emphasize content with lower credibil-
ity, stemming amplification efforts. For example, Facebook might
choose to de-prioritize suspicious content for appearance in users’
News Feeds. If successful, these types of approaches could have
significant impact on the speed and reach of influence campaigns,
while affording flexibility in cases where detection algorithms are
uncertain. At the same time, more aggressive approaches would
raise even more pressing free speech concerns.
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3.3 Response 3: Defensive Manipulation
In the face of a sufficiently grave threat one might argue for a
response in kind—in this case, counter-messaging aimed at the
same target population, designed to undo or mitigate the impact
of malign IO. This counter-messaging or counter-manipulation
could, in theory, leverage similar clickbait, sensationalism, and
emotional charge to meet these ends. Attribution of content—that
is, the source of counter-messaging—could be more or less trans-
parent.7 We refer to this family of potential responses, broadly, as
defensive manipulation.
The Institute of Land Warfare paper referenced earlier describes
an assertive vision that appears to fall into this category. Specifically,
it proposes that “the U.S. national security enterprise requires AI-
driven influence policy [of its own]” [53, p. 10]—one centered on
persistent, wholesale content curation aimed at the generation of
viral effects:
...competitors must be beaten at scale, with truth-
ful content. Given the current state of technology,
the DoD has the necessary data to create a better,
more truthful firehose. The U.S. military must curate
faster than its opponents can lie, by filtering streaming
field footage, creating content out of existing mission
command feeds and aiding public affairs’ functions
with chat-bots. The DoD needs radical transparency,
though certainly with a selective eye; existing AI ca-
pabilities can provide it. [53, p. 9]
If engaged, this type of action could arguably fall within the
scope of efforts envisioned by the Smith-Mundt Modernization
Act of 2012 [55], which “authorized the domestic dissemination
of information and material about the United States intended pri-
marily for foreign audiences, and for other purposes.” In practice,
the Act served as an amendment to the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948,
lifting a longstanding ban on the domestic dissemination of mate-
rials produced by the US State Department and the independent
Broadcasting Board of Governors, allowing products like Voice
of America, Radio Free Europe, and the Middle East Broadcasting
networks to reach Americans [40]. However, the Act also contains
an express prohibition on any use of appropriated funds to "influ-
ence public opinion in the United States." Further, the Act narrowly
applied only to the State Department and the BBG, which both
operate under existing checks on their authority aimed to prevent
propaganda [43].
4 NAVIGATING RESPONSES WITH AI:
CRITICAL CHALLENGES
It is worth underlining that Responses 1 and 2, in particular, would
rely on robust partnership with industry actors, and likely, buy-in
from users themselves. While analyses of these relationships is
out of scope for this paper, the technical and ethical challenges we
explore have been selected with an eye toward these concerns.
7An example of defensive manipulation might be found in the well-known case of
YouTube’s “Redirect Method,” which sends users searching for extremist/terrorist
propaganda to videos that aim to debunk such messages and de-radicalize viewers
[22].
In-practice detection. All three responses outlined above rely on
fair, explainable, highly accurate, automated approaches to disin-
formation detection—an ask that is currently out of reach. “Fake
news” detection is an emerging area of active of research8, but
current tools still suffer from relatively low accuracy, work best in
circumscribed contexts, and critically, are focused on separating
“true” from “false” content, rather than understanding its origin. Not
all content disseminated by malign foreign actors is, or needs to
be, categorically false. While, not all content generated and spread
by legitimate users is true. Indeed, a key strategy of the Internet
Research Agency during 2016 elections was to seek out and amplify
native content deemed to meet their objectives [21].
The reverse scenario is also cause for concern: in addition to
adversaries amplifying user-generated content that serves their
ends, they also generate content that users themselves amplify. Such
cases raise questions about the timeline for and nature of flagging
or removing content. For example, if a user re-shares content that
a defensive AI later tags as disinformation, should the suspected
malicious content be addressed only at the point of origin, or at the
point of sharing as well?
Persistent surveillance. Another set of technical and ethical ques-
tions raised by likely future real-time approaches to disinformation
detection have to do with persistent, comprehensive surveillance
of the social media landscape and massive-scale data mining. Per-
haps, aspirationally, precautions could be put into place that enable
monitoring individual data without storing it. However, given the
complex nature of the task, detection algorithms would likely not
operate effectively on individual pieces of posted content alone.
Rather, they will need to consider user history, metadata, embedded
social networks, and related contexts–information which would
need to be in memory. Dual use of such tools, security vulnerabili-
ties, and privacy concerns will all be at stake.
Contextualization vs Influence. In our discussion of Response 1
(flag/contextualize IO), we pointed to Facebook’s “Related Arti-
cles” feature as a positive example. However, there is important
nuance to consider, around the choice of context to provide, and
the specific way in which to provide it—in particular, if the selec-
tion of contextualizing content is automated. One might imagine
the slippery slope from the first (or second) class of responses to
the third, whereby adding context or strategically emphasizing or
de-emphasizing particular content effectively becomes an instance
of defensive manipulation. To varying degrees, all three responses
thus raise related, urgent questions about AI-driven influence pol-
icy. How would such an AI be trained? What would it optimize for?
Who would decide?
A speculative 2017 essay published by the Atlantic Council brings
a worst case scenario to life in an alarming vignette titled the “in-
fluence machine,” outlining a dystopian future of global informa-
tion warfare [5]. AI systems generating computational propaganda
dominate conversations online, and the information environment
devolves into a morass of competing, state-sponsored, manipulative,
machine-driven speech. The author cautions:
8See, e.g., https://www.aclweb.org/anthology/C18-1287/ and http://www.
fakenewschallenge.org.
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The community of democracies must recognize the se-
rious threats posed by [AI-driven conversation tools],
computational propaganda, and weaponized narra-
tives. Democracies must move aggressively to address
these threats on multiple fronts, by crafting compre-
hensive strategies to protect their populations from
online propaganda and disinformation, while main-
taining the core democratic values of equality and
liberty. (p. 2)
With these possible (if hypothetical) futures in mind, we turn
now to the values at stake in the decisions the security community—
and the public governing it—will soon have to make. How ought
they respond to threats of online influence? What are the ethical
ramifications of each approach? When, if ever, is any approach
appropriate?
5 THE ETHICS OF WAR
Traditionally, philosophical reflection on the ethics of military en-
gagement has navigated a course between “realism” on one hand
and “pacifism” on the other. Realists hold that war stands com-
pletely apart from the rest of human affairs, such that there is no
sense in discussing the right and wrong of war; war just is. As
Michael Walzer describes the realist position: “War is a world apart,
where life itself is at stake, where human nature is reduced to its
elemental forms, where self-interest and necessity prevail. Here
men and women do what they must to save themselves and their
communities, and morality and law have no place” [61, p. 3]. At the
other end of the spectrum, pacifists argue that all war is unethical,
that moral analysis cannot rationalize the human costs of war. As
Cheyney Ryan puts it, pacifists “unconditionally oppose war” [44,
p. 2]. The first extreme excludes ethics from the realm of war; the
second excludes war from the realm of ethics. If there is an “ethics
of war,” then, it lay not at either extreme but rather somewhere
along the spectrum.
Just War Theory is the predominant effort to articulate such a
middle position. It asks: (1) what are the conditions that justify
waging war (jus ad bellum), and (2) what are the principles of right
conduct in war (jus in bello) [25]. Though there is considerable
debate amongst scholars about the details, the terms of the debate
are more or less settled. Just war is necessary (i.e., war must always
be the last resort) and proportional (the good war achieves must
outweigh the harm it causes).9 Likewise, conduct in war is just
so long as it necessary, proportional, and it discriminates between
civilians and combatants (Ibid.).
Gray zone conflict complicates this picture, as it challenges a
number of assumptions about war that are foundational to deter-
mining whether any particular war is necessary and proportional,
and whether conduct in war is necessary, proportional, and discrim-
inating [12]. First, information operations test the boundaries of
the concept of war itself, calling into question the basic distinction
between war and peace. The kind of war at the center of Just War
Theory is bloody war—attacks that involve maiming and killing.
IO, by contrast, rarely causes harms that grave, leading some to
9Just War theorists often stipulate other ad bellum principles, such as just wars being
motivated by just causes and having reasonable prospects for success. As Lazar argues,
however, necessity and proportionality are the only strictly necessary conditions for
just war (even at the same time as they are not—even jointly—sufficient) [25].
describe it as a form of “soft war” [19]. As Mariarosaria Taddeo
argues, the necessity condition—the condition that war only ever be
waged as a last resort—is premised on the enormity of war’s harms;
absent such harms, it is not clear that the necessity condition holds
[51, 52].
Second, IO raises questions about the balancing of good and
harm required by the proportionality principle, for the same reason
it challenges the necessity principle: the harms imagined by Just
War Theory are not (generally) the harms wrought by gray zone or
“soft war” tactics [20]. Themoral dilemma JustWar Theory attempts
to resolve arises in the first place because the harms of war are,
to use Taddeo’s language, “universal” harms—i.e., extensive loss
of life [52, p. 218]. Because gray zone tactics are non-violent and
thus cause far less serious harms, it is possible (assuming war is
motivated by a just cause) that on a Just War Theory analysis gray
zone conflict is always justified, despite the fact that gray zone or
soft war tactics may nevertheless have significant and intuitively
unethical consequences (Ibid.). In other words, gray zone conflict
threatens to tilt the moral balance of Just War Theory, from an
ethical framework that hardly ever sanctions war (i.e., war as a last
resort) to one that nearly always sanctions it.
Third, IO complicates the distinction between combatants and
civilians/non-combatants. As discussed in Section 2, the “informa-
tion environment”—the “battlefield” for information operations—
permeates civil society. And though propaganda efforts and other
PSYOPs and IO operations have always targeted the “hearts and
minds” of civilians, today’s pervasive information and communica-
tions technologies (ICTs) open up vast new possibilities for gray
zone efforts. “As the means and opportunities for propaganda con-
tinue to expand with technological advances,” writes Laurie Blank,
“so do the targets and goals of that propaganda” [3, p. 89]. Fur-
thermore, as Taddeo points out, the problem is not simply that it
becomes easier (and perhaps more justifiable) to target civilians in
soft war contexts; it also becomes easier for civilians to actively
participate in these activities. “Civilians may take part in a combat
action from the comfort of their homes, while carrying on with
their civilian life and hiding their status as informational warriors”
[52, p. 218].
Finally, an important implication of the “battlefield” permeating
civil society, one which has gone largely unnoticed in the existing
literature, is the degree to which U.S. intelligence and national secu-
rity organizationswill have to engagewith us—with the information
U.S. citizens produce, seek out, and consume—in order to mitigate
the effects of foreign influence operations. As the discussion in
the previous section suggests, it is easy to imagine the security
community involving itself—“actively” and “persistently”—in our
own domestic information environment. Defensive operations of
that kind raise urgent ethical questions about when, how, and to
what extent the military ought to engage in influence operations
(or counter-influence operations) aimed inward at the populations
they aim to defend.
Just War Theory, the ethical framework normally used to guide
and evaluate efforts by the military and national security apparatus,
appears, then, to offer little guidance here. In what remains, we sug-
gest that examining these questions through the lens of “cognitive
security” may provide a (partial) path forward.
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6 TOWARD AN ETHICS OF COGNITIVE
SECURITY
There is muchwork to be done adapting ethical frameworks, such as
Just War Theory, to the normative challenges of gray zone conflict,
and we can only tackle a small part of that task here. Importantly,
we put aside questions about how to evaluate the ethical stakes
of offensive IO—i.e., if and when it is justified to deploy influence
operations against foreign populations. With respect to defensive
operations, however—e.g., which, if any, of the three responses
to foreign influence campaigns, outlined above, the military and
national security apparatus ought to adopt in cases where IO is
targeted at US citizens—progress might be made by casting the
question in terms of cognitive security.
To our knowledge, the term cognitive security was introduced
by Rand Waltzman—an analyst at RAND Corporation—first in a
2015 report10 and then in testimony before the United States Senate
Armed Services Committee’s Subcommittee on Cybersecurity in
2017 [60].11 In his testimony, Waltzman makes an urgent case that
our reliance on internet platforms for information and communi-
cation is making us increasingly vulnerable to outside influence
[60]. The internet and social media, he argues, have created “a qual-
itatively new landscape of influence operations, persuasion, and,
more generally, mass manipulation” [60]. As our interactions with
and reliance on these technologies evolve, “old models are becom-
ing irrelevant faster than we can develop new ones. The result is
uncertainty that leaves us exposed to dangerous influences with-
out proper defenses” [60]. Collectively, Waltzman refers to these
vulnerabilities as challenges to cognitive security.
While Waltzman’s rhetoric is often dramatic (e.g., “Today, thanks
to the Internet and social media, the manipulation of our perception
of the world is taking place on previously unimaginable scales
of time, space and intentionality” [60]), his assessment parallels
concerns emerging from many quarters (discussed in Sections 1
and 2, above). In order to respond to these challenges, Waltzman
envisions a “whole of nation approach”: government, academia, and
industry engaged in a continual arms race to influence and protect
from influence large groups of users online. Driving these efforts, he
advocates “a new field of cognitive security,” related to but distinct
from existing cybersecurity programs. Notably, he suggests that:
Although COGSEC [cognitive security] emerges from
social engineering and discussions of social deception
in the computer security space, it differs in a number
of important respects. First, whereas the focus in com-
puter security is on the influence of a few individuals,
COGSEC focuses on the exploitation of cognitive bi-
ases in large public groups. Second, while computer
security focuses on deception as a means of compro-
mising computer systems, COGSEC focuses on social
influence as an end unto itself. Finally, COGSEC em-
phasizes formality and quantitative measurement, as
distinct from themore qualitative discussions of social
engineering in computer security.
10Report cited in Waltzman (2017).
11It is worth noting that the term “cognitive security” is sometimes used in a very dif-
ferent way—namely, as a marketing term for cybersecurity products driven by artificial
intelligence. See, for example, https://www.ibm.com/security/artificial-intelligence.
The specific details ofWaltzman’s proposal are less important for
our purposes than the framing. In an important 2005 essay, philoso-
pher Helen Nissenbaum examines differences between what she
terms, on one hand, “technical computer security,” and on the other
hand, then-emerging discussions about “cybersecurity” [35].12 For
Nissenbaum, the differences between these two terms have less to
do with the techniques they involve (they largely overlap) than with
the worries that motivate them. Understanding those differences is
key to determining what strategies (technical and otherwise) are
justified in their name.
Security is safety from harm, Nissenbaum argues, and the harms
imagined by proponents of technical computer security differ from
the harms imagined by proponents of cybersecurity. Technical com-
puter security is concerned with protecting information systems
and their users from a particular set of harms, usually described in
terms of “availability, integrity, and confidentiality” [35]. Which is
to say, the techniques of computer security are designed to ensure
that information is available when users want it, that the informa-
tion is uncorrupted, and that it is only available to those authorized
to access it. By contrast, cybersecurity is broader in scope. While
securing information systems is part of cybersecurity’s mandate,
the harms cybersecurity advocates imagine are graver: they are
not merely threats to individuals, but rather to society at large. For
example, cybersecurity efforts aim to defend against:
“Threats posed by the use of networked computers as
a medium or staging ground for antisocial, disruptive,
or dangerous organizations and communications; [...]
Threats of attack on critical societal infrastructure, in-
cluding utilities, banking, government administration,
education, healthcare, manufacturing, and commu-
nications media; [...and] Threats to the networked
information system itself ranging from disablement
of various kinds and degrees to—in the worst case—
complete debility.” [35]
The “moral force” behind arguments in favor of taking drastic
action to advance cybersecurity derive from the severity of the
threats it is assumed to protect us from. And Nissenbaum argues
that the threats around which cybersecurity is oriented are not sim-
ply larger threats than those technical computer security focuses
on (in the sense that the former have to do with threats to society,
while the latter has to do with threats to individuals); cybersecurity
threats are cast in existential terms. Following the terrorist attacks
of September 11th 2001 in the United States, the need for cyberse-
curity was understood as essential to protecting the very existence
of the American Republic [35]. Ethically, far more drastic—and per-
haps invasive—actions are warranted to protect society from an
existential threat than are warranted to protect individuals from
less dire ones. For example, as is now well-known, following 9/11
the national security apparatus put into place a dragnet surveillance
program, which tracked nearly all phone calls and text messages
sent and received through major US carriers. It is arguable whether
or not such a program was justified (we do not think it was), but
whatever one’s position, Nissenbaum’s argument highlights the
12Nissenbaum renders the term “cyber-security,” with a hyphen. We adopt today’s
more common, non-hyphenated formulation.
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fact that it is only possible to justify such a program in the name of
securing Americans against a truly existential threat.
With this as background, we can ask the following: what are the
harms cognitive security aims to protect us from, how dire are they
(are they existential?), and consequently, what kinds of responses
are warranted? Such questions are, at least in part, empirical, and
we are not prepared to answer them here. We suggest, however, that
the security community must become prepared to answer them, as
the kinds of issues discussed throughout this paper become part of
its purview. If some—like Rand Waltzman—are to be believed, the
threats to cognitive security posed by digital influence campaigns
are, indeed, existential. That is why, to their minds, actions such
as those outlined in “Response 3,” above, may be warranted. In our
view, the case is less clear. What is clear is that the bar for such
justifications is very high.
Furthermore, the issue is not only the severity of the harms cog-
nitive security promises to protect us from; questions remain about
the nature of these harms too. As we’ve seen, the harms of war that
ethicists have traditionally contemplated differ in kind from those at
stake here. Information operations do not threaten grievous injury
and death, at least not directly. Rather, they threaten informational
harms—harms scholars working in other domains have analyzed
carefully. Meeting the ethical challenges of combating automated
influence therefore requires integrating insights from privacy and
information ethics, AI ethics, and the ethics of influence into exist-
ing cyberwar ethics frameworks. While pursuing that project in
earnest is outside the scope of this paper, we hope our discussion
will draw attention from scholars working in these spaces to the
places where they overlap.
6.1 Privacy and Information Ethics
Although much remains unknown about how the security commu-
nity is preparing to counter emerging threats in the information
environment, one thing is clear: responding to the threat of auto-
mated influence requires collecting, storing, and processing vast
amounts of data about civilians, including U.S. citizens. The Snow-
den revelations demonstrated that, historically, the intelligence and
national security communities have subordinated privacy concerns
to issues of national security, justifying widespread, indiscriminate
surveillance in the name of national defense. If military conflict
continues to evolve in the direction of increasing engagement in
the information space, questions will be raised anew about how to
balance these values.
As these issues develop, lessons from the vast literatures on in-
formation privacy and information ethics will be invaluable. For
example, privacy scholars have long argued—contrary to prevailing
opinion—that privacy and security are not necessarily competing
values, and that treating them as such often produces a false binary
for policymakers [48]. When considering the informational harms
beyond privacy harms that IO and cyber conflict threaten, the infor-
mation ethics literature can provide useful insights as well. Taddeo
has begun the work of extending Just War Theory frameworks to
more robustly contemplate informational harms [52]. Discussions
about war ethics and discussions about privacy and information
ethics would be much enriched by further efforts in this vein.
6.2 Ethics of Algorithms/AI
The same is truewith respect to the emerging literature on the ethics
of algorithms/AI ethics. Many of the ethical issues raised by the
incorporation of AI-driven technologies intomilitary conflict mirror
issues raised by the use of AI in civil society contexts, and the rapidly
developing discussions around AI ethics and policy in the latter
context can offer guidance for the former. For example, the question
of how to attribute causal and moral responsibility for actions
carried out by machines in military conflict—a longstanding subject
of debate in cyberwar ethics [e.g., 11, 13]—could benefit from related
discussions in the ethics of algorithms and AI [for an overview, see
32]. A related, but distinct issue, which has been the subject of
significant technical, policy, and ethics research around algorithms
and AI is the degree to which the operations of automated systems
can be made intelligible to human users [e.g., 37]. If AI-driven
systems are used to counter IO in the ways described above—by
flagging or contextualizing suspected disinformation, removing
or suppressing it, etc.—it will be relevant to discussions about the
ethics of such strategies whether or not the users generating and
consuming affected content can be made to understand how it
is being influenced. There are no doubt many more examples of
overlapping issues—e.g., discussions about algorithmic bias [e.g., 2,
16] and trust in automated systems [e.g., 41]—whichwouldmutually
benefit from dialogue between AI ethics scholars and military ethics
scholars.
6.3 Ethics of Influence
Finally, the issues raised by the preceding discussion point to the
special relevance of the ethics of influence to emerging debates
in the ethics of military and gray zone conflict. As discussed, AI
ethics and policy scholars have begun to address concerns about
the use of algorithms to curate, personalize, and target informa-
tion at individuals—to influence, even manipulate them—and have
raised important ethics and policy questions about these practices.
If war ethics scholars aim to offer meaningful guidance to the se-
curity community about how to respond ethically to the emerging
information threats described above, this nascent literature is an
indispensable starting point for understanding them. At the same
time, while AI ethics and policy scholars often point to uses of
these technologies by adversaries, they have not addressed head-on
the complex ethical issues destined to emerge from attempts by
the intelligence and security communities to mitigate them. Thus
if scholars working in these fields hope to fully grapple with the
challenges of automated influence, they have as much to gain as
they have to offer by engaging with the ethics of war.
7 CONCLUSION
Few issues in recent years have captured public attention like the
threat of foreign influence campaigns. While technology ethics, law,
and policy scholars have explored these problems, the conditions
that enable them, and strategies for utilizing norms, laws, code, and
market forces to solve them, too few scholars have trained their
sights on the inevitable entrance of the intelligence and national
security apparatus into the fray, and on its ethical consequences.
Our aim in this paper has been tomotivate such efforts by describing
what is known, publicly, about how the security community is
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thinking about and planning to engage, to discuss why existing
military ethics frameworks are unsuited to the task of evaluating
such engagement, and to suggest a path forward by casting these
questions in terms of cognitive security. The security community
must now decide how to incorporate the challenges of cognitive
security into its work.
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